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Abstract
There is a lack of data in recent history of food
terrorism attacks, and as such, it is difficult to predict its
impact. The food supply industry is one of the most
vulnerable industries for terrorist threats while the
poultry industry is one of the largest food industries in
the United States. A small food terrorism attack against
a single poultry processing center has the potential to
affect a much larger human population than its
immediate consumers. In this work, the spread of
foodborne pathogens is simulated in a poultry
production and processing system to defend against
intentional contamination. An agent-based simulated
environment that represents the farm, processing plant,
homes, and restaurants is developed, which contains
both poultry and human agents that move through the
system and possibly infect each other. The simulation is
run by varying several parameters that include
probability of infection if exposed for both poultry and
humans. The simulation predicts the number of infected
poultry and humans over time.
Introduction
Often overlooked as a contingency, the food supply
sector represents a substantial risk in human safety and
healthy lifestyles. While safe transportation and
regulation is being pursued heavily after the events of
September 11, 2001, there is considerable uncertainty in
the ability to prevent or halt food terrorism, defined as
“an act or threat of deliberate contamination of food for
human consumption with biological, chemical, and
physical agents or radionuclear materials for the purpose
of causing injury or death to civilian populations and/or
disrupting social, economic, or political stability”
(Setola and Maggio 2009). Tommy Thompson, the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, even hinted toward the unpreparedness of the
United States in regard to food terrorism when he
resigned, stating, “I, for the life of me, cannot
understand why the terrorists have not . . . attacked our
food supply because it is so easy to do” (Roberts 2006).
There is a lack of data for intentional contamination
and possible outcomes due to lack of actual attacks
making it past the initial target; however, a biological
attack has potential to affect a larger population as a
whole. This lack of data makes preparing for food
terrorism difficult (Layfield et al. 2008).
The top three most important foodborne outbreaks
of 2016 include Salmonella linked to poultry, Listeria
linked to frozen vegetables, and hepatitis A from raw
scallops (Flynn 2016). CDC’s FoodNet monitors
foodborne diseases from ten United States cities and in
2016 identified 24,029 infections, 5,512
hospitalizations, and 98 deaths caused by foodborne
pathogens (Marder et al. 2017). The FoodNet
surveillance network does not track all cases in the
United States (CDC 2017) and the most recent estimate
of the total number of cases is from a 2011 study
(Scallan et al. 2011). Foodborne morbidity and
mortality associated with pathogen contamination of the
United States food supply results in an estimated 48
million cases, of which 128,000 are hospitalized and
3,000 are fatal (Handley et al. 2015; Scallan et al. 2011).
This estimation means that approximately 15% of the
United States population is affected with a foodborne
illness every year. Of all these illnesses, salmonellosis
is one of the most common, costing $3.3 billion annually
in medical bills and productivity loss in the United
States (Handley et al. 2015). These are most likely not
intentional contaminations, but it begins to shine some
light on how vulnerable the industry could be if an
intentional attack slipped through the cracks.
Poultry products rank in the upper echelon of
commonly consumed foods, globally, and in the United
States, poultry began surpassing beef consumption after
2010 (Handley et al. 2015). In 2013, the United States
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Figure 1: The general poultry food supply chain (Setola and Maggio
2009).
measured in at 639.6 million pounds of broiler meat
shipped (Handley et al. 2015). As one of the largest
sources of food in the United States, poultry is a top
contender for possible food terrorism targets. There are
also many vulnerable entry points for threats between
each processing step as shown in Figure 1.
Even if a foodborne illness threat is neutralized
quickly, traced back to the source, and taken off the
shelves, if there were some people affected, there is still
the possibility for contagious varieties of pathogens to
be passed around to other people.
Methods
Overview
The approach taken in this project is to simulate the
spread of foodborne pathogens among poultry and
humans using an agent-based simulation model. The
simulation steps are: use a focused software suite
specifically for agent-based simulation, choose common
and substantial pathogens to simulate, and determine
agents such as chickens and humans.
The software suite chosen for this project is
NetLogo, a robust modeling environment for designing
agent-based simulations (Wilensky 1999). In NetLogo,
each agent is programmed with a set of rules for actions
such as movement around patches and interactions with
other agents. It comes with disease models (Rand and
Wilensky 2008) and has been used for modeling the
immune system (Chiacchio et al. 2014).
In the United States, it is estimated that 31 different
pathogens end up causing 37.2 million morbidity and
mortality with 9.4 million of them being foodborne.
Salmonella is one of the most common pathogens in the
United States at 1 million estimated annual morbidity
and mortality cases, 19,000 estimated annual
hospitalizations, and 380 estimated annual fatal cases
(Scallan et al. 2011). As prominent as it is, Salmonella
was chosen as a starting point for gathering meaningful
simulation data. The Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) would be considered a good primary
resource for further pathogen selection.
Having a software suite and pathogen to study is
only half of the simulation: the simulation also requires
the interacting agents, for example, poultry and humans
in the current case. The simulation distinguishes
different demographics in the humans, as there are
varying susceptibilities to Salmonella and other
pathogens. For example, the age of a given population
will affect how easily the illness affects the agent. In
addition to the varying demographic, the project
manipulates the infection rate based on how much
exposure to the food pathogen sources occurs when they
are being consumed. For example, it is necessary to
consider a specific population’s frequency in eating out
of home to adjust the exposure of certain pathogens.
Human agents were divided into three age groups:
young, middle, and old based on differing susceptibility
to the given pathogen, Salmonella.
During the different parts of production, as shown
in Figure 1, the poultry have multiple opportunities to
encounter the pathogen. As they get further along the
supply chain, through processing, logistics, and
consumption, the poultry are moved around in groups
(not autonomously roaming) and may come into contact
with other poultry who in turn may also become
infected. As the poultry are moved to wholesalers,
stores, or restaurants, they may come in contact and
infect humans based on exposure to the infected poultry.
NetLogo Overview
NetLogo identifies various groups of agents with
their individual behaviors and frees them to disperse and
engage in an interactive environment (Wilensky 1999).
Simulations are comprised of turtles, the moving and
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acting agents in the simulation, and patches, the space
in which the turtles move and interact.
The turtles are sectioned into differing breeds that
have different rules and variables to act under. These
different breeds then move around and can be set to
behave in specified ways depending on what breed with
which they are interacting.
The patches act as a grid that the turtles are set to
move around and possibly interact with other turtles.
Each patch can have different properties that affect
turtles and perhaps other patches.
Every time tick, there is a loop that goes through
each turtle and tells them to do their next step in the
simulation. The ticks can represent any appropriate unit
of time such as seconds, minutes, hours, or days. Ticks
can be slowed down or sped up to focus on specific areas
of the simulation or to generally speed things up to
gather a greater quantity of data.
Breeds, Patch Types, and Customizable Properties
For this project, there are 2 different breeds of
turtles and 4 different kinds of patches. Turtles can be
either poultry (plural poultry) or person (plural people)
as shown in Figure 2. Both breeds may also be gray,
signifying a pathogen infection, or black, indicating no
infection. There are four different kinds of patches
representing the farm, processing plan, restaurants, and
houses.
Both the person breed and poultry breed have a
member variable for infection. When true, the person or
poultry will change from its normal color variation
(black) to its infected color (gray). There is also an
infection modifier variable set upon turtle creation that
can manipulate the probability for that person/poultry to
be infected. The infection modifier mostly comes into
play for differing age groups of people since there are
varying susceptibilities to pathogens.
The poultry breed has properties to help identify
which part of the supply chain it should be in currently.
There is a counter variable to keep track of how long it
has been in its current section. There are also two
Boolean properties, alive and processed, to identify
which sections the poultry have already visited. If the
poultry are not alive, then they have already been
slaughtered, etc.
The person breed has four separate properties: age
group, infection timer, house number, and restaurant
timer. The age group property determines the turtle
property infection modifier. People have an adjustable
infection timer to specify how long they are infected
with pathogens such as Salmonella that are typically
fought off after a week’s time. The house number is the
number of the house to which each person is assigned.
The restaurant timer is for counting down how long a
person has been in a restaurant.
Figure 2: Poultry and persons colored black indicate no infection,
while poultry and persons colored gray represent a pathogen
infection
The four different patch types do not act by
themselves, but they do affect the actions of the turtles
on them. Turtles check the kind of patch they are on and
act accordingly. For instance, when on the farm patch,
the poultry breed roams around randomly. While on the
processing patch, the poultry stay in the position they
are assigned. Both breeds stay stationary on the
restaurant patch. The person breed stays stationary
while on the house type. The farm patch type includes a
large area to allow the poultry to move around freely.
The processing patch type also includes an area,
although it is much smaller than the farm type. The
restaurant and house patches are setup to be individual
patches that count the number of people currently in that
patch.
In addition to all the specific properties for turtles,
there are a variety of sliders easily changed in the user
interface. These sliders include the following: setting
the number of people in the simulation, the number of
houses and restaurants, the frequency people visit
restaurants, the infection duration, the probability of
poultry infecting people on the same patch or poultry on
the same patch, the initial number of poultry, and the
spawn rate of poultry.
Workflow
The simulation is loosely based off Figure 1 and the
simulation flow diagram is shown in Figure 3, with the
poultry trickling down through steps where threats can
be inserted, finally landing in a patch with the
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consumers. Prior to the simulation starting, or any time
during the simulation, the user can select poultry to “get-
infected”. This is how intentional contamination is
simulated.
Figure 3: Simulation flow diagram of the flow of poultry and persons
in the simulated environment consisting of the farm, processing
plant, restaurants, and houses. See Figure 2 for legend.
When the simulation is initiated, there is a set
number of poultry provided by a slider. These poultry
are placed in the large farm patch section. There is also
a spawn rate for poultry to be continuously added to the
farm patch section to simulate continual poultry
breeding. Each poultry has a timer and, when it reaches
a threshold, it moves to the next section. This timer is
meant to simulate a poultry’s growth cycle before being
butchered. During its time in the farm patch section,
each simulation tick, poultry randomly select a direction
around them in a 360-degree radius and move forward
one patch. If there is an infected poultry on a given
patch, there is a probability, modified by slider, for other
poultry on the given patch to also become infected.
The second section poultry move to after their
counter is expired is the smaller processing patch
section. Unlike the farm patch section, once a poultry is
assigned a specific patch in the processing plant patch
section, the poultry does not move. Multiple poultry can
be placed on one patch. This is meant to represent
groups of poultry being close together during the
processing stage while not really being in contact with
some other groups. If there is a poultry on a given patch
that is infected, there is a probability of infecting other
poultry on the same patch at each simulation tick. A new
counter is started for each poultry when moved to the
processing patch section.
The third and final section for poultry is the
restaurant. After a poultry’s processing plant section
timer reaches a threshold, the poultry is moved to a
randomly selected restaurant. A final countdown is
started once moved to a restaurant, and the poultry is
deleted at the end of this timer to simulate the poultry
being consumed. If there is an infected poultry in a
restaurant patch, there is a probability every tick that any
poultry or person in that restaurant patch will also
become infected.
The person turtles simply alternate between the
house patches and the restaurant patches. An initial
number of people is set before the simulation setup and
the number of people never changes throughout the
simulation. When a person is created, it is assigned a
house patch to which it will always return. While on a
house patch, people can be set to have a chance to infect
the other people in the house, or the slider can be moved
all the way to make 0% of people infecting each other.
Every tick, there is a probability, set by slider, that
each person will go to a randomly selected restaurant
patch. These are the same restaurants that poultry can be
sent to during their final step. If there is an infected
poultry in a restaurant, it has a probability of infecting
the person that has arrived at the restaurant. This is the
driving interaction of people becoming infected from
the infected food supply. If people are set to be able to
infect each other, a person may become infected by
another person visiting the restaurant. The amount of
time that people stay in restaurants can be set by slider
and adjusted to better simulate the shorter duration of
restaurant visit and longer duration of staying at home.
Results
The developed simulations can visualize and
quantify multiple scenarios with varying parameters.
For example, a plot that shows the number of uninfected
(healthy) people along with the number of infected
people with three infection rates is shown in Figure 4
and a plot that shows the number of uninfected poultry
along with the number of infected poultry with three
infection rates is shown in Figure 5. Both plots update
every tick in the simulation and can easily be exported
to a spreadsheet to conduct further analysis.
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Figure 4 shows three different sections of time that
had differing infection probabilities in people. The
section with the line labeled with a “1” shows a 0.1%
poultry-to-people infection probability per tick, section
“2” shows a 2.5% infection probability, and section “3”
shows a 5.0% infection probability. The data changes in
real time as adjustments are made to the simulation
sliders. It is clear to see that the difference between 1%
and higher percentages is strong while the doubling
from 2.5% to 5.0% makes a much smaller difference
Figure 4: Number of infected people over time with different
poultry-to-people infection probabilities
Figure 5 shows the number of poultry at three
different periods of time that had differing poultry-to-
poultry infection probabilities. Section “1” shows a
poultry-to-poultry infection probability of 5.1%, section
2 shows a 10% probability, and section 3 shows a
30.05% probability. The sections over 5.1% show a
significant increase in infection. While 10% and 30.05%
probabilities do not differ much in terms of maximum
amount of poultry infected at one time, 30.05%
probability shows a much less varied graph.
Conclusions and Future Work
A food supply chain intentional pathogen injection
simulation was built using the NetLogo agent-based
modeling simulation software for a poultry production
and processing system. These simulations can help
Figure 5: Number of infected poultry over time with different
poultry-to-poultry infection probabilities
prevent food terrorism by predicting the spread and
effect of foodborne pathogens including the number of
infected poultry and the number of infected people over
time with varying probabilities of infection. The
simulation is loosely based on the poultry food supply
chain, but it can be improved in the future by adding
more stages in the production and processing,
simulating the use of antibiotics and cleaning methods,
and by using more accurate epidemiological models to
create a more realistic simulation of the system. In
addition, another category of highly susceptible people
such as cancer patients on chemotherapy could be
added. It would be interesting to compare and contrast
an actual paired set of demographics for example a
suburban Florida community with more retirees
compared to an inner-city area with younger people.
Finally, once a more detailed model is developed, it
could be validated by comparing it with an actual well-
documented outbreak.
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